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Abstract 
 This study used the works of Barro(1990), Bakare(2011), and Dissou 
and Yakautsava (2011) to establish the relationship between government 
spending, corruption and output growth in Nigeria. It employed aggregated 
data from 1980 to 2011. Using the Johansen Maximum Likelihood procedure 
and error correction mechanism, the study showed that the estimates of 
money supply, capital formation, openness to trade and innovation system 
positively influenced output growth while unemployment and domestic debt 
affected output negatively. Public investment as a percentage of GDP and 
corruption influenced adversely output growth. The paper recommends that 
corruption tilts public spending away from growth enhancing projects and  
towards low and less productive ones.  
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Introduction 
 The involvement of government in the economy rests on three major 
roles namely: allocative, stabilization and distributive. The state is also 
saddled with the responsibility of making available certain goods and public 
services to every member of the society. The existence of corruption in any 
economic system may prevent government from fulfilling its roles as 
expected. Empirical studies on corruption are well documented in the 
literature. In particular, a number of empirical analyses on corruption have 
explored Barro (1991) and Levine and Renelt (1992)10 specifications. There 
are two branches of corruption thoughts in the literature. A branch of study 
suggests that corruption serves as stimulant which drives economic growth 
thereby providing an easy route for individuals to get things done by 
circumventing bureaucratic processes. Advocates of this view feels that 
                                                          
10 These approaches have regressed cross-sectional estimates of corruption on the average 
rate of  economic growth and a set of control variables. 
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when bribes are given to individuals, it would motivate the speed of job turn-
over faster than expected (See the works of Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968; 
Acemoglou and Verdier, 1998 for details). The other branch of corruption 
study posits that corruption exerted negative effects on long run growth path 
through its impact on the quality of infrastructures, governance, government 
expenditure, resource allocation and welfare ( Aidt, 2003; Svensson, 2005). 
 The author is very mindful of the fact that there are many ways in 
which corruption could impede economic growth. Apart from the work by 
Mauro(1995) which underscores the effect of corruption on growth through 
investment channel, Pellegrini and Gerlaugh(2004) approached the theme 
"corruption and economic growth" by establishing an indirect relationship 
route through human capital, political/economic stability and degree of trade 
openness. The literature evidence has shown that corruption rendered the 
efficacy of tax collection useless, skewed the composition of government 
expenditure away from growth enhancing projects towards less productive 
ones. In line with this, Rose-Ackerman (1999) noted that corrupt bureaucrats 
tends to commit scarce economic resources to the type of expenditure that 
favours bribes accumulation. However, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) identified 
the examples of public expenditure that favours corruption. They observed 
that expenditures in military equipments and large infrastructural projects are 
conduit pipe where state resources are squandered. Along the same line of 
reasoning, Mauro(1997), Gupta et.al.(2001), Tanzi, (1998), De La Croix and 
Delavallade (2007) argued that bribes could be easily be extracted from 
expenditure which involves high military defence armaments and 
infrastructure project such as hospital building, whose exact value and costs 
could not be easily ascertained than expenditures on teacher's salary.  
 Manifestation of corruption in public spending comes in the form of 
project execution, procurement of goods and services, extra budgetary 
spending, payments of salaries/wage to people who are not in employment 
contract, payments to dead pensioners, etc. The critical and fundamental 
question that needs to be addressed centres on the issue of transparency and 
institutional coherence within the system. Addressing this issue could foster 
good governance devoid of corrupt practices. Corruption is more visible and 
sustainable in an economy when public officers and representative of the 
citizens in government who were saddled with the responsibility of 
managing public resources perverted it for personal enhancement to the 
disadvantage of the society at large.                
 The model employed in this study is based on asymmetric 
information on the part of government and its agents which created a gap in 
information flow regarding the behaviour of the agents in terms of the 
provision of goods and services. Corruption cases in the public sector are 
similar to what is described in the principal-agent problem. The principal in 
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this case is the government. The government assigns responsibilities and 
duties to the agents. Along the line of execution, the agents perverted public 
responsibilities for personal gains. Bardhan (1997) and Azariadis and Lahiri 
(1997) explored similar explanations to analyze the behaviour of government 
agents in relation to the provision of public infrastructures. This study used 
an econometric techniques to analyze the effect of corruption on the 
efficiency of public expenditure and how it impacted on growth in Nigeria. 
A Barro (1990) type endogenous growth model provided the bedrock of 
explaining the nexus of public spending, corruption and economic growth. 
Mauro (1997) and De La Croix and Doepke(2009) used similar model to 
analyze the relationship between corruption and growth. Apart from the 
introduction, section 2 contains the stylized facts and review of literature, 
section 3 presents the theoretical framework and methodology, while section 
4 analyses the estimation techniques. Section 5 presents the empirical results 
while section 6 gives the concluding remarks. 
 
Stylized Facts and Review of  Related Literature 
Corruption in Nigeria: The Evidence 
 The definition given by the World Bank  relates corruption to 
betrayal, misrepresentation on the part of public officers in the course of 
discharging the duties assigned to them to gain undue pecuniary benefits has 
attracted significant attention to the study of corruption in Nigeria. 
Accordingly, studies are inundated on the relationship between corruption 
and public spending both in the developed and developing economies. 
However, literatures converged in opinion11 on the effect of corruption on 
public spending and the consequential effects on  economic growth. 
                                                          
11. For more discussion on the impact of corruption on public spending, see the works of 
Mauro (1995), Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004), Rose-Ackerman (1999) and Shleifer and 
Vishney (1993).  Tax distortions and misallocation of government expenditure featured as 
critical channels through which corruption impacted on growth in developing economy. 
3. The succession of dictatorial regimes, disregard of human rights, political instability and 
economic mismanagement have all contributed to cast Nigeria in a bad light internationally. 
These factors have also served to undermine Nigeria’s economic growth and development  
potential, in terms of global development indicators. With a per capita income of $1,149, 
Nigeria ranks amongst the least developed countries in the World Bank league tables ( See 
Salisu, 2000).  Governors of various states appropriate public funds and allowances (e.g. 
monthly ₦5million as wardrobe allowance) to themselves which  provide ample avenue for 
active money laundering. Some of these state governors have been found in law court to 
have committed electoral fraud and were consequently removed from office but without any 
confiscation of their properties or refund of the ill-gotten wealth. The senators appropriate 
huge money to themselves, continuously review upward their salaries and allowances, and 
belong to several sub-committee of the senate on  one socio-economic issue or the other 
which serves as channels for wasting public funds in terms of over-bloated and spurious 
sitting allowances, claims and budgets. 
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According to Human Rights Watch Report (2008), during the oil boom 
period, Nigeria made headlines with its oil resources, capable of financing a 
number of important projects to meet basic consumption and development 
needs. However, these resources are not channelled to the areas that are 
useful for the growth of the economy3. Beside this, corruption became a 
salient feature of the Nigerian economy particularly in the procurement of 
contracts and in the regulation of the economy and official business in 
general (Whitaker,1991). Most government decisions including legislative 
bills and litigation were driven by financial considerations. 
 Despite the huge oil revenue, Africa Confidential, 1999 report 
revealed that about 70 per cent of the population wallows in abject poverty 
and despair. The windfall gain from oil has not reflected in the overall living 
standard of the population. Today across Nigeria, public services have 
deteriorated sharply with bourgeoning poverty level. Ethnic diversity and 
parochial political interest among the ethnic tribes have further threatened 
the stability of the economy. With the emergence of democratic rule in 
Nigeria in 1999, this trend has not been reversed. The discovery of oil has 
been a blessing and a curse to Nigeria. It is a blessing because the oil wealth 
provided Nigeria with an easy entry into international capital markets. It also 
allowed the country to embark on large-scale public and private sector 
projects. The oil revenue has also introduced opportunities for rent-seeking 
behaviour and corrupt practices in both public and private sectors of the 
economy. 
 Corruption was reported as one of the problems confronting Nigeria’s 
economic, political and social stability. It ranges from petty corruption to 
political or systemic corruption. Studies conducted by the World Bank 
(2007) have shown that corruption constituted a major factor which 
decimated the growth of GDP in countries like Nigeria, Kenya and 
Venezuela. However, it has been widely reported in the literature that 
corruption is harmful and detrimental to sustainable growth and development 
(Tanzi, 2002; Svensson, 2005; Gyimah-Brempong, 2002). The rate at which 
corruption is growing in the developed and developing countries sensitized 
the consciousness of the German-based non-governmental organization 
Transparency International (TI) to embark on a survey of corruption in 
countries where it is prevalent. A total number of 85 countries was surveyed 
in 1997 and Nigeria ranked 81st position. This implies that Nigeria ranked as 
the 5th most corrupt country in 1997. Similarly, the surveys of 1998, 2000 
and 2001 further ranked Nigeria as the 2nd  most corrupt nations in the 
world. The 2005 survey was carried out on 163 countries and Nigeria ranked 
in the 142nd position. This implies that Nigeria ranked 22nd most corrupt 
nation during the study period. Table 1 provided the detail ranking of Nigeria 
on the Transparency International's corruption index during the period 1998 
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to 2011. Until June 2007, Nigeria has not been exonerated from the list of the 
top leading countries on corruption. In its 2012 report, Nigeria scored 27 out 
of a maximum 100 marks to occupy the 139th place out of the 176 countries 
surveyed in the report. With the latest ranking, Nigeria moved up four places 
from its ranking of 143 out of the 183 nations surveyed by TI in 2011. The 
country was ranked 134 out of 178 surveyed nations in 2010; 130 out of 180 
nations in 2009; 121 out of 180 in 2008; Table 1 below summarises 
Nigeria’s ranking for the fourteen-year period (1998-2011). 
Table 1: Fourteen-Year Ranks of Nigeria on Transparency International's Corruption 
Perception Index (1998-2011)   
Year* CPI** Rank*** Position from Bottom**** 
1998 1.2 81/85 5th 
1999 1.6 98/99 2nd 
2000 1.2 90/90 1st 
2001 1.0 90/91 2nd 
2002 1.6 101/102 2nd 
2003 1.6 132/133 2nd 
2004 1.6 144/146 3rd 
2005 1.9 152/168 6th 
2006 2.2 142/163 22nd 
2007 2.2 147/179 33rd 
2008 2.7 121/180 60th 
2009 2.5 130/180 51st 
2010 2.4 134/178 45th 
2011 2.5 143/182 39th 
Source: Transparency International. www.transparencyinternational.org 
 
 Notes: *Year of report. Data refers to the previous year during which 
the survey was conducted; ** CPI = corruption perception index; its value is 
between 0 (extreme corruption) and 10 (no corruption at all); *** Countries 
are ranked by their CPI scores. The numerator is the rank of Nigeria and the 
denominator is the number of countries surveyed. For instance, 81/85 means 
that Nigeria was ranked at the 81st position out of 85 countries surveyed in 
1997 (i.e. the year before 1998). In other words, Nigeria was ranked the 5th 
most corrupt country in 1997; **** A lower position indicates worsening 
corruption while a higher position indicates improvement (reduced 
corruption) relative to other countries. 
 The corruption picture on Nigeria based on Transparency 
International scores and ranking fundamentally classified Nigeria as an 
underdeveloped country. The Nigeria Corruption Index (NCI) of 2005 and 
2007 developed by CLEEN foundation have identified some key 
organizations found to be corrupt based on the survey administered. The 
percentage score on the table indicated the level of corruption assigned to 
each sector. From Table 2, the average score for the two periods indicated 
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that the police force had the highest score of 98%. It was followed by the 
Power Holding Company with 85%. Immigration and Passport had 52%, 
followed by Federal Road Safety and Local Government Authorities with 
47%. Independent National Electoral Commission, Federal Inland Revenue 
and Ministry of Health have 38%, 36%, 31% respectively. Other 
organizations included in the survey are: ministry of Justice, Ports Authority, 
Nigerian National Petroleum Commission, the presidency and Federal 
Housing Authority with the following scores: 29%, 29%, 28%, 27% and 
27%,  respectively. The table shows that almost all sectors in Nigeria are 
corrupt. 
Table 2 : Average Ranking of Corrupt Organizations in Nigeria 
                                       Organization Year 2005 
% Score 
Year 2007 
% Score 
Average 
% Score 
The Police 96 99 98 
Power Holding Company Nigeria (PHCN) 83 87 85 
Ministry of Education  63 74 69 
Custom and Excise Department 65 61 63 
Federal Road Safety Corp. (FRSC) 42 51 47 
Immigration/ Passport Office 56 48 52 
Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board 41 47 44 
Local  Government Authorities 47 46 47 
Independent National Electoral Commission INEC) - 38 38 
Tax Official /Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRES) 36 36 36 
Health Ministry/ Primary Health/ Teaching Hospital 30 32 31 
Ministry of Justice 27 31 29 
The Presidency 24 29 27 
Nigeria National Petroleum Commission (NNPC) 27 28 28 
Federal Housing Authority 26 28 27 
Nigeria Ports Authority/ Nigeria Maritime Authority 33 24 29 
Source: Nigeria Corruption Index (2007), CLEEN Foundation. 
 
Review of Related Literature 
 There is a growing body of literature on corruption system. However, 
evidence on the effects of such system on economic performance is multi-
dimensional and massive. Landmarks in the literature in this area include 
Mauro(1995,1997), Tanzi and Davoodi(1997),Rose-Ackerman(1999), 
Mo(2001), De La Croix and Delavallade(2007), d'Agostino et.al(2011), 
Dissou and Yakautsava(2011). Corruption is more pervasive in developing 
countries as it affects expenditure on public projects. A number of evidences 
have been provided in the literature on the impact of corruption on growth. 
Most importantly, Mauro(1997) documents that corruption tilts away public 
expenditure from growth enhancing projects towards less productivity ones. 
Similar to Mauro's view, Tanzi and Davoodi(1997) observed that corruption 
provided an easy route where public funds are freely expended on bribe-
seeking projects. The conclusion drawn from these studies are quite 
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instructive and informative. If corruption persists in an economy, public 
funds would be misallocated and misdirected to growth retarding projects 
with consequential effects on the quality of public infrastructures. 
 Empirical studies have provided mixed results on the effects of 
government expenditure on economic growth. The empirical regularity in the 
literature pointed at the influence of corruption on the composition of 
government expenditure thereby perverting the expenditure efficiency 
towards enhancing growth-driven projects where the scope for corruption is 
restricted (Mauro 1995,1997; Brunetti,1997; Ehrlich and Lui, 1999; Li, Xu 
and Zou ,2000; Mo ,2001; Abed and Davoodi,2002). Tanzi and Davoodi 
(1997) provided evidence on the influence of corruption on public spending. 
It was observed that corruption provided opportunity for rent-seeking and 
misallocation of public spending. With the incentives to be gained from 
corruption, public officers often commit public funds to projects whose exact 
values are difficult to estimate. More so, the revenue accruable to the 
government from the project are cornered by the corrupt officers to meet 
personal needs. Examples of projects where the scope for corruption is high 
in Nigeria are: government spending on military equipments, large 
infrastructure projects on hospital facilities, education equipments, electricity 
projects, water projects etc.  
   A number studies have identified different channels in which 
corruption could affect growth. Ndikumana(2007) provided a detailed 
taxonomy of these channels and the policy implications on growth. 
Baliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumana (2007) used Arellano Bond GMM 
technique to analyze the impact of corruption on growth by exploring 
investment channel. Findings from this study shows that corruption reduces 
the efficiency of private investment and at the same time raises production 
costs. Some branch of studies has also linked corruption to government 
spending and economic growth using panel data. Findings from these studies 
show that corruption reduces government size and worsen the level of per 
capita income (Ehrlich and Lui,1999). Similar results were obtained by Mo 
(2000) and Mauro(1995). 
 
Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
 In this section, the work of Dissou and Yakautsava (2011) serves as 
the building framework of our model. This model assumes that corruption 
decimated the value output and growth. The model is described as explained 
below: 
 
The Basic Model  
 The model specified in this study comprised three economic agents: 
consumer, firm and government. The consumer is assumed to maximize its 
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utility subject to a given constraints. Also, the consumer owns the 
representative firm. It therefore implies that any profit made by the firm is 
accruable to the consumer. The firm’s production function is built around 
public and private capital as inputs. Consumer's disposable income is spent 
on consumption, while the surplus is channelled to investment. Government 
levy taxes on income with the objective of running a balanced budget. If 
government is committed to growth enhancing projects with sincerity of 
purpose, it implies that all revenue inflows in the form of taxes would be 
invested completely on public capital. However, if government is committed 
to corrupt projects, only a fraction of the revenue inflows from taxes would 
be used to finance public capital. The remaining fraction is consumed as 
bribe.  
 
The Consumer  
 We assumed that the individuals in the economy lived infinitely and 
derives greater utility from consumption of goods and services. The utility 
function of the consumer is expressed as:  
𝑢 = ∫ 𝑒−𝜌𝑡∞0 �𝑐𝑡1−𝜎− 11− 𝜎 � 𝑑𝑡         (3.1) 
 Where ρ is time preference, σ is elasticity of substitution and Ct is 
consumption. 
 
The Firm 
 Firm's production function is expressed in the form of Cobb-Douglas 
production function given as: 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝐾𝑡1−𝛼𝐺𝑡𝛼               (3.2) 
 where Kt and Gt are factor inputs. The production function is 
homogeneous of degree1  and has diminishing marginal returns to factor 
inputs.  
 
The Government  
 The government levy taxes on output with the goal of running a 
balanced budget:  
𝐺𝑡 =  𝜏𝑌𝑡 ,         0 < 𝜏 < 1           (3.3) 
 Equation (3.3) shows that government spending cannot exceed 
revenue inflow from taxation.  If government is seriously committed to 
growth enhancing projects, it would ensure that no part of the revenue 
inflows from tax are channelled to questionable and unproductive projects by 
the corrupt public officials. The assumption that is placed on this model is 
that the firm takes government action in regards to tax administration as 
given and exogenous, the production function can be rewritten by 
substituting equation 3.3 into equation 3.2, which gives: 
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𝑌𝑡 =  𝐾𝑡1−𝛼(𝜏𝑌𝑡)𝛼      (3.4) 
 Solving and expressing  𝑌𝑡  as the subject,  the production function 
now becomes: 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝜏𝛼 1−𝛼⁄ 𝐾𝑡      (3.5) 
 The first expression after the equality sign, 𝜏𝛼 1−𝛼⁄  is private marginal 
product of capital. By assumption, the consumers are expected to spend their 
income on goods and services and saves the surpluses. Note that : 𝑌𝑡 −  𝐺𝑡  =
𝐶𝑡 + ?̇?  and  𝑌𝑡  = 𝐶𝑡 +  𝐾𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡̇ ,  where 
𝐺𝑡  =  𝜏 𝑌𝑡 . The aggregate budget constraint for the economy  can now be 
expressed as: 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝐶𝑡 +  ?̇?+ 𝐺𝑡          (3.6) 
 Given the above budget constraint of the consumer, private capital is 
obtained by making ?̇?  the subject of the formular and taking the derivative 
of ?̇? with respect to time. This gives the law of motion as expressed below: 
𝑑𝐾𝑡
𝑑𝑡
=  ?̇? =  (1 − 𝜏)𝑌𝑡 −  𝐶𝑡     (3.7) 
 The optimization problem now can be expressed as: Maximize Utility 
function defined by equation (3.1), subject to the budget constraint defined 
by equation (3.7). By substituting equation (3.5) into (3.7) gives: 
?̇? =  (1 − 𝜏)𝜏𝛼 1−𝛼⁄ 𝐾𝑡 −  𝐶𝑡     (3.8) 
 Using the Hamiltonian, equation (3.8) yields: 
?̇?
𝐶
= 𝛾 =  1
𝜎
�(1 −  𝜏)𝜏𝛼 1−𝛼⁄ −  𝜌�    (3.9) 
 Equation (3.9) represents the growth rate of output. A clear 
observation from equation (3.9) shows that imposition of tax has two 
conflicting effects on economic growth. First, imposition of tax drives 
growth directly because it enters negatively in the term within the 
parenthesis. Second, imposition of tax drives growth indirectly by increasing 
the private marginal product of capital. If the government is corrupt, it 
implies that not all the collected tax revenue are invested in public capital, 
rather, only a fraction of the revenue are invested in public capital, Gt , while 
the remaining fraction 𝜀𝑡 represents the amount taken out of production 
machinery in the form of bribery. If we assume that the government has the 
following budget constraint : 
𝐺𝑡 =  𝜏𝑌𝑡 −  𝜀𝑡      (3.10) 
𝐺𝑡 is the amount government spends on public capital. 𝜏𝑌𝑡 is tax revenue 
inflow, and 𝜀𝑡 is aggregate bribes collected and diverted out of production 
machinery. There are two different permutations in which corruption may 
operate. 
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Permutation 1 
 Let us first consider a situation where the amount of bribe collected 
by public officials is linear and directly proportional to tax revenues 
collected: 
𝜀𝑡 =  𝜇𝜏𝑌𝑡 , 0 <  𝜇 < 1      (3.11) 
 µ represents corruption intensity. If corruption intensity rises, then 
the aggregate level of corruption is also expected to rise. No matter the 
amount the government decides to raise from taxes, there is always a 
constant amount programmed by the public offices to be diverted for 
personal enrichment. If we combine (3.10) and (3.11), corrupt government 
budget constraint becomes: 
𝐺𝑡 = (1 − 𝜇)𝜏𝑌𝑡       (3.12) (1 − 𝜇) represents the fraction of tax revenue used for public capital. The 
remaining fraction  is consumed by rent-seekers, who are subset of the larger 
society. Substituting Equation (3.12) into equation (3.2) , we get : 
𝑌𝑡 =  [(1 − 𝜇)𝜏]𝛼 1−𝛼⁄ 𝐾𝑡       (3.13) 
 Corruption intensity reduces the private marginal product of capital [(1 − 𝜇)𝜏]𝛼 1−𝛼⁄  in equation (3.13). Bribe can be regarded as a windfall 
addition to consumer's income, and it impacted on consumption and savings 
level. Initially, bribe does not enter the decision set of the representative 
consumer. The consumer’s disposable income is spent on consumption, 
while the excess is channelled to saving. From equation (3.10), expressing 
𝜏𝑌𝑡  as the subject of formular, we have: 𝜏𝑌𝑡 =  𝐺𝑡 +  𝜀.Aggregate output in 
the economy comprised of consumption, investment, effective public 
spending and  bribes as shown in the equation below: 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝐶𝑡 +  ?̇? +  𝐺𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡              (3.14) 
 If ?̇? is expressed as a dependent variable and taking note of equation 
(3.13), capital evolves based on the law of motion as: 
?̇? =  [1 − 𝜏][(1 − 𝜇)𝜏]𝛼 1−𝛼⁄ 𝐾𝑡 −  𝐶𝑡            (3.15) 
 Equation (3.15) shows that corruption intensity has a greater 
influence on the overall level of corruption and it hinders the economy's 
drive at accumulating required capital for necessary growth. We observed 
that bribe constitute an unexpected addition (windfall) to consumer's income. 
Therefore, the utility function of the consumer is modified to capture the 
windfall gains from bribes and this is expressed as: 
𝑈(𝑐𝑡) +  𝑉(𝜀𝑡),𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑈(𝑐𝑡) = 𝐶𝑡1−𝛼−11−𝜎             (3.16) 
 The objective function now is equation (3.16), while the budget 
constraint is given by equation (3.15). The consumer maximizes equation 
(3.16) subject to equation (3.15). The growth rate is derived using the 
Hamiltonian and the first order condition without corruption, we have: 
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𝛾 = 1
𝜎
�[1 − 𝜏][(1 − 𝜇)𝜏]𝛼 1−𝛼⁄ −  𝜌�            (3.17) 
 Equation (3.17) further shows that corruption intensity parameter, µ, 
reduces the private marginal product of capital and this have implications on 
growth. 
 
Permutation 2 
 If corruption intensity is introduced in a non-linear form, 
government’s budget constraint is: 
𝐺𝑡 =  𝜏𝜃𝑌𝑡 ,     𝜃 ≡ 1 +  𝜇             (3.18) 
 Where 𝜇 (𝜇 ≥ 0).  If 𝜇 equals zero, it implies that government 
commits all revenue inflow from taxes to public projects. In most cases 
however, government display some form of corrupt behaviour by investing 
in low quality and welfare degrading projects that allows corrupt government 
bureaucrats to divert public funds for personal gains. This behaviour 
diminishes the efficiency of tax revenue on public projects. It therefore 
implies that some amount of public resources is wasted on unproductive 
expenditure by the corrupt bureaucrats. 𝜀𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝜇) 𝜏𝑌𝑡 represents the 
amount wasted on unproductive expenditure. (1 − 𝜏𝜇)  is the amount 
diverted from productive public spending. It should be noted that when 
corruption intensity increases, (1 − 𝜏𝜇) also increases but at a decreasing 
rate. The firm cannot influence both the government revenue decisions in 
regards to tax administration and corruption intensity parameter. They are 
exogenous to firm's production decision. The firm's production function can 
be expressed  as: 
𝑌𝑡 =  [𝜏](1+𝜇)𝛼1−𝛼 𝐾𝑡               (3.19) 
 In the presence of corruption, the private marginal product of capital 
falls, while in its absence, it rises. The private marginal product of capital in 
the presence of corruption is given by: [𝜏](1+𝜇)𝛼1−𝛼   , while in its absence, it is 
given by: [𝜏] 𝛼1−𝛼 . The private marginal product of capital in the presence of 
corruption is lower than the one obtained in its absence, and is given by the 
equation below: [𝜏](1+𝜇)𝛼1−𝛼 < [𝜏] 𝛼1−𝛼               (3.20) 
 We observed from the model that sustainable growth in output is 
stunted by corruption. If the factors driving corruption are not effectively 
checked, it would impact severely on the steady state output and economic 
growth. 
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Model Specification 
 The empirical models for this study are derived from the theoretical 
framework discussed in section 3.0 above. In this study, the work of Barro 
(1990) and Bakare (2011) serves as the building framework of our model. 
We extend this model by including corruption among the factor inputs in the 
production technology. As specified by Barro (1990), aggregate output is 
expressed as:  
βα
YGAKY =                        (3.24) 
 where: Y = Real output; A= Productivity index; K = Private capital; 
GY = Public investment.    
 Corruption enters the model through public spending. β represents 
the elasticity of output with respect to public investment, while α is the 
elasticity of output with respect to capital. β is dependent on the level of 
corruption in the society. If corruption variable is included in the model, it 
would assist in ascertaining the actual amount of national resources eroded 
out of productive machinery towards corrupt activities. With this in mind, 
we therefore need to extend government expenditure function to capture 
corruption. 
Gt(ρ) = G*te-γρ                (3.25) 
 where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, and  
G*t = G0egt                           (3.26) 
 The parameter ρ represent corruption index. γ gives the intensity of 
corruption in government spending. From equation (3.26), the growth rate of 
government spending G*t  is g. We assume that  �
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝜕𝜌
� < 0 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 �𝜕2𝐺𝑡
𝜕𝜌2
� > 0 
. It is observed from equation (3.25) that if corruption term is not included, 
that is: if (ρ) = 0 and (γ = 0), then G*t = Gt.  
 The modified version of Barro(1990) and Bakare(2011) model is 
stated in a functional form as: 
𝑔𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑡  = 𝑓(𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑡 ,𝑢𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡 ,𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑡, 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑡 , 𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡 , 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 ,𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡)         
(3.27) 
 where : 
grth = growth rate of real output;  
rms =  money supply; 
 uemp = unemployment rate;  
pubinv = share of domestic public investment in GDP;  
cor = corruption perception index;  
rcap = capital formation;  
debt =  domestic debt ;  
open = openness to trade;  
nsi = national system of innovation; 
 t = time 
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The model can be expressed in a linear form as: 
𝑔𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑡 = 𝜔0 +  𝜔1𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑡 +  𝜔2𝑢𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡 + 𝜔3𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑡 + 𝜔4𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝜔5𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡 +
𝜔6𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜔7𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔8𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡 +  𝜇𝑡                       (3.28) 
 The parameters to be estimated are 𝜔1, 𝜔2,𝜔3, 
𝜔4,𝜔5,𝜔6,𝜔7 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜔8. μt = Error term. 
 We expect the parameters to be estimated to exhibit the following 
signs: 𝜔1˃0, 𝜔2˂0, 𝜔3 ˃0, 𝜔4˂0, 𝜔5˃0, 𝜔6˃0, 𝜔7˃0, 𝜔8˂0. Based on 
economic theory, the variables on the right hand side of  equation (3.27) 
influences  real growth in Nigeria.   
 
Data and Methodology 
 The data used for this study are from many sources. Real money supply, 
unemployment rate, public investment, capital formation, openness to trade and 
domestic debt for 1980-2012 were obtained from the Central Bank of Nigeria 
Statistical Bulletin. Public investment data is proxied by government capital 
expenditure. Corruption variable were obtained from the  various publications of 
Transparency International (TI), online. Other data were obtained from the World 
Development Indicator CD-ROM (2012). Three variables (growth rate of real 
output, money supply and capital formation) are transformed to natural logs. The 
logs of the variables were taken to reduce the variance level and also to linearize the 
variables in the analysis. Some preliminary tests were carried out on the data used 
for the analysis to ensure that our regression estimates were free from misleading 
results. The data employed in the study were estimated in phases starting with the 
unit root test, co-integration and estimation of error correction in the model (ECM). 
Specifically, the stationarity tests was conducted to ascertain the order of integration 
of the variables using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillip-Perron (PP) 
Tests respectively. The co-integration test seeks to examine whether there is long-
run co-movement in the variables used in the model. The ECM, measures the short 
run dynamic adjustments towards long run equilibrium.  
 
Empirical Evidence 
Unit Root Test 
 The unit root tests revealed that all the variables are not stationary at 
the same level. While the growth rate of real output and money supply are 
stationary after second differencing, all other variables are stationary at first 
differencing. In order to determine how to model the short-run dynamics of 
real output growth, it is therefore important to carry out tests for 
cointegration. Table 3 show the unit root test results. 
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Table 3:  Unit Root Test Results 
Variable  ADF C.V 1% C.V 5% PP C.V 1% C.V 5% O/I 
grth** Level -4.2946 -4.3240 -3.5806 -4.2664 -4.3240 -3.5806      I2 
2nd Diff -5.1346 -4.4983 -3.6584 -5.6501 -4.3561 -3.5950 
rms** Level -1.2788 -4.2846 -3.5629 -1.6160 -4.2733 -3.5578      I2 
2nd Diff -7.9734 -4.2967 -3.5684 -16.6091 -4.2967 -3.5684 
uemp** Level -0.7157 -4.2733 -3.5578 -0.5649 -4.2733 -3.5578      I1 
1st Diff -5.5559 -4.2846 -3.5629 -5.5784 -4.2846 -3.5629 
pubinv** Level -0.9517 -4.2733 -3.5578 -1.5138 -4.2733 -3.5578      I1 
1st  Diff -4.7670 -4.2846 -3.5629 -4.7506 -4.2846 -3.5629 
cor** Level -3.0029 -4.2733 -3.5578 -3.0029 -4.2733 -3.5578      I1 
1st Diff -5.8171 -4.2967 -3.5684 -12.9937 -4.2846 -3.5629 
rcap ** Level -0.1902 -3.6537 -2.9571 -2.4255 -4.2733 -3.5578      I1 
1st Diff -4.7538 -4.2846 -3.5629 -4.8095 -4.2846 -3.5629 
debt** Level -3.8356 -4.2846 -3.5629 -3.4556 -4.2733 -3.5578      I1 
1st Diff -4.8510 -4.2846 -3.5629 -4.8195 -4.2846 -3.5629 
open ** Level -3.5879 -4.2733 -3.5578 -3.5879 -4.2733 -3.5578      I1 
1st Diff -8.4306 -4.2846 -3.5629 -9.5543 -4.2846 -3.5629 
nsi** Level -1.2959 -4.2846 -3.5629 -2.2659 -4.2733 -3.5578      I1 
1st Diff -8.6888 -4.2846 -3.5629 -22.6937 -4.2846 -3.5629 
   Source: Computed from E-View 7.0 . Note ** = trend and intercept. 
ADF = ADF Test Statistics.  C.V = Critical Values. PP = Phillips Perron Test Statistics. O/ I 
= Order of Integration. 
 
Cointegration Test 
 There could be a situation when two or more time-series may not be 
stationary, it becomes imperative that we test whether there is a linear 
combination of them that are stationary. This phenomenon is referred to as 
test for cointegration. When there is cointegration among the variables, it 
implies that long-run relationship exist among the variables. However, the 
short-run dynamics of the model can be represented by an error correction 
mechanism (Engle and Granger 1987). We applied both the Engle-Granger 
Two-Step procedure and the Johansen Maximum Likelihood Methodology 
for the cointegration test. Table 4 show the results of the cointegration test 
using the Engle-Granger Two-Step procedure.  
Table 4: Result of the Cointegration Test Using the Engle-Granger   
 Dickey 
Fuller 
Augmented- Dickey Fuller Phillips 
Perron 
Conclusion 
One lag Two lags 
Residual 
from 
the Static 
Long run 
Model 
-3.3230** -4.3743** -4.3943** -4.3561** There is 
Cointegration 
Note ** implies that the residual is stationary at the 1 % level of significance  
 Source: Computed from E-view 7.0  
 
 Table 5 presents the results of the cointegration test, using the 
Johansen methodology. We analyze the results based on the trace and the 
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maximum eigen-value statistics. The trace statistic indicates 6 cointegrating 
equations at the 5% level of significance, while the max-eigen-value test 
indicates 5 cointegrating equations at the 5% level. The cointegration test 
results are therefore uninformative about the number of cointegrating 
relations among the variables. However, Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) have 
pointed out that both the trace and the maximum-eigen value statistic give 
conflicting conclusions and decision about the number of cointegrating 
vectors should be based on economic theory or other available information. 
We therefore proceeded on the basis that at least, there is cointegration and 
then focused on the cointegrating relation that explains the growth rate of 
real output. This led to our normalization with respect to the growth of  real 
output variable.  
Table 5: The Johansen Cointegration Test  
     
     Hypothesized Trace 0.05 
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.9939  407.6409  197.3709  0.0000 
At most 1 *  0.8878  249.6510  159.5297  0.0000 
At most 2 *  0.7995  181.8353  125.6154  0.0000 
At most 3 *  0.7337  132.0244  95.75366  0.0000 
At most 4 *  0.7060  91.01080  69.81889  0.0004 
At most 5 *  0.5451  53.06563  47.85613  0.0150 
At most 6  0.4711  28.64885  29.79707  0.0674 
At most 7  0.2063  8.901039  15.49471  0.3746 
At most 8  0.0545  1.736639  3.841466  0.1876 
     
     Note: Trace test indicates 6 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level, * denotes rejection of the 
hypothesis at the 0.05 level, ** MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999)  p-values.  
     
     Hypothesized Max-Eigen 0.05 
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.9939  157.9899  58.43354  0.0000 
At most 1 *  0.8878  67.81570  52.36261  0.0007 
At most 2 *  0.7995  49.81095  46.23142  0.0199 
At most 3 *  0.7337  41.01357  40.07757  0.0391 
At most 4 *  0.7060  37.94516  33.87687  0.0154 
At most 5  0.5451  24.41678  27.58434  0.1208 
At most 6  0.4711  19.74781  21.13162  0.0772 
At most 7  0.2063  7.164400  14.26460  0.4699 
At most 8  0.0545  1.736639  3.841466  0.1876 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates 5 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level, * denotes rejection 
of hypothesis at 0.05 level, ** MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999)  p-values 
 Source: Computed from E-view 7.0  
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The Short-run Dynamics of the Growth Rate of Real Output  
 To the extent that the growth rate of real output and the regressors of 
the model are not stationary and cointegration is established, the appropriate 
mechanism for modelling the short run growth rate of real output for Nigeria 
is an error correction mechanism(ECM). The error correction model for the 
growth rate of real output was conducted. From the unit root test results, we 
observed that the growth rate of real output and real money supply were 
stationary at second difference, while unemployment rate, share of domestic 
public investment in GDP, corruption index, capital formation, domestic 
debt, openness to trade and national system of innovation were stationary at 
first difference. From the results, the ECM was estimated on the basis of the 
order of integration of the variables. However, the parsimonious ECM model 
produces the result presented in table 6. The parsimonious ECM was 
obtained by deletion of insignificant coefficients from the estimates (See the 
over parameterized model in table A1 of the appendix). 
Table 6:Estimated Parsimonious Error Correction Model 
          Dependent Variable: ΔGRTH   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.0067 0.1581 0.0422 0.9669 
ΔRMS 1.3956 1.4585 0.9568 0.0353 
ΔUEMP -0.0342 0.0381 -0.8980 0.0383 
ΔUEMP(-1) -0.0649 0.0434 -1.4956 0.0154 
ΔPUBINV(-1) -1.0565 0.6866 -1.5389 0.0143 
ΔCOR -0.4552 0.2136 -2.1309 0.0490 
ΔRCAP(-1) 0.4184 0.8928 0.4686 0.0646 
ΔDEBT -1.5002 1.3841 -1.0838 0.0295 
ΔOPEN 2.9896 0.8328 3.5897 0.0025 
ΔOPEN(-1) 0.7190 0.7327 0.9814 0.0341 
ΔNSI 0.1997 0.0545 3.6665 0.0021 
ΔNSI(-1) -0.0048 0.0576 -0.0834 0.0935 
ECM(-1) -1.3076 0.3274 -3.9936 0.0503 
     
     R-squared 0.7623     Mean dependent var 0.0657 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5839     S.D. dependent var 0.6031 
S.E. of regression 0.3890     Akaike info criterion 1.2515 
Sum squared resid 2.4214     Schwarz criterion 1.8644 
Log likelihood -5.1464     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.4434 
F-statistic 4.2749     Durbin-Watson stat 1.7524 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0040    
          Source: Computed from E-view 7.0 
 
 The growth rate of real output is influenced by changes in money 
supply, unemployment rate, share of domestic public investment in GDP, 
corruption, capital formation, domestic debt, openness to trade and national 
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system of innovation. The ECM showed the expected negative sign and is 
significant at 5 per cent. The coefficients of money supply, lagged one period 
capital formation, openness to trade in lag one period and national system of 
innovation conformed to our expectation with positive signs. For real output 
to be increased and sustained, there should be a corresponding increase in the 
level of investment and innovation system. Trade openness positively 
influence output. This result conformed to the empirical findings of some 
studies which relate trade openness positively with output (Tybout 1996, 
Wong 2006, Haddad et.al 1996). Unemployment and domestic debt 
coefficients are negatively signed and conformed to our expectation. High 
unemployment rate discourages output. The argument put forward in this 
paper in respect of domestic debt is that it could retard the growth of output 
particularly if it is a "dead weight debt". If the debt contracted are not used 
for growth enhancing projects. The most interesting part of the result are the 
estimates of corruption and the share of domestic public investment in GDP 
(proxied by capital expenditure), reflecting a negative relationship with the 
real output growth. There were empirical regularities in the literatures 
confirming that corruption reduces the efficiency of investment and skewed 
the composition of government spending to less productive activities. In the 
long run, sustainable growth is impaired (see Brunetti 1997; Wei 1997; 
Alesina 1999 and Murphy 1993; Mo (2000), Pellegrini and Gerlaugh (2004) 
and Gyimah-Brempong and Camacho (2006). The negative sign attached to 
the coefficient of capital expenditure implies that the components of the 
expenditure are affected with corruption. Public officers prefer to commit 
state resources to big projects whose values are difficult to ascertain and at 
the same time the benefits accrued to individual hands through bribes and 
rent seeking to growth enhancing counterparts projects. Expenditure that 
falls into this category in Nigeria include: military equipment spending, 
construction of bridges and roads, infrastructure expenditure, etc. Corruption 
has a long run implication on the growth of output. It reduces the 
productivity of capital and labour inputs causing their respective marginal 
physical productivity to fall and at the same time affect their efficiency in 
terms of  contribution to output. 
 The coefficient of determination measures the goodness of fit of the 
estimated model. The model is good in its prediction, and it explains about 
76 per cent of the behaviour of real output growth in Nigeria. As expected, 
the error correction term ECM(-1) is of the expected  negative sign and is 
significant in the growth function. The Johansen Maximum Likelihood was 
applied in order to get the determinants of the long run real output growth. 
The choice draws from the fact that the static long run model, which is 
obtained by the ordinary least squares, leads to biased and inconsistent 
estimates of the long run parameters. Table 7 show the normalized 
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cointegrating equation of  real output. Real output is driven by changes in 
money supply, reduction in unemployment and corruption rate, increase in 
the rate of investment, reduction in domestic debt, increase in trade openness 
and innovation system.   
Table 7: Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients 
Cointegrating equation(s) :Log likelihood   185.6687 
Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients (Standard error in parentheses) 
𝐺𝑟𝑡ℎ           𝑟𝑚𝑠           𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝         𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑣           𝑐𝑜𝑟            𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑝            𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡          𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛            𝑛𝑠𝑖 
            1.000         2.0276       -0.1135      -1.3879       -2.0491      0.7471     -3.9135     1.5075       
0.4473 
                              (2.2322)     (0.0065)     (0.1510)     (0.0631)    (0.1773)   (0.2389)   (0.2356)    
(0.0145)   
 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 Primarily, this paper has examined the relationship between output 
growth, corruption and public spending in the context of Nigerian economy 
over the period 1980 to 2011. Accordingly, various channels driving 
corruption and its implication on growth have also been taxonimized. 
However, a number of channels have been identified in the literature. These 
include: investment, human capital, political stability, trade openness, 
distortion in tax collection and public expenditure. Since this paper focused 
on corruption in public spending, the author therefore maintains the position 
that corruption reduces and diminishes the efficiency of public expenditure. 
The categories of public expenditure most affected by corruption were: 
public investment projects, procurement of goods and services, extra 
budgetary expenditure, "ghost" workers, dead pensioners, goods and services 
provided at below-market prices. This study provides evidence that 
corruption drives economic growth negatively and it also reduces the  quality 
of public infrastructure and diverts the public spending to projects vulnerable 
to corruption.    
 A model of corruption was described to explain the behaviour of 
corrupt bureaucrats. This model was adapted from the work of Dissou and 
Yakautsava (2011) as the building framework. The model assumed that the 
economy comprised three agents, namely,  consumer, firm and government. 
The three agents were interdependently connected together by economic 
activities in the economy. The behaviour of these agents determines the 
pervasiveness of corruption in the economy. Using Barro(1990) and 
Bakare(2011) specification, our result show that the estimates of money 
supply capital formation, openness to trade and national innovation system 
positively influence real output. Unemployment and domestic debt have 
negative influence on real output. Of most interest are the coefficients of 
corruption and the share of domestic public investment in GDP. Both 
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coefficients negatively related with real output. This implies that public 
spending and corruption are inter related with one another. Corruption tends 
to enlarge the scope of public spending towards bribe enhancing projects that 
would benefit the bureaucrats.      
 The study further shows that in the long run, real output is driven by 
the growth in money supply, trade openness, national system of innovation 
and the rate of investment. In line with this explanation, corruption 
diminishes the quantum of public investment required to drive growth. 
Further findings from the result show that corruption affects negatively; the    
efficiency of capital and at the same time reduces its marginal productivity.  
This could have  long run implications on output growth.    
 It is recommended that the Nigerian government should be more 
pragmatic in its efforts towards sensitizing the society against the problem of 
corruption and also set up a functional anti-corruption agency that would 
probe into corruption cases. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1 : The General / Overparameterized Error Correction Model 
Dependent Variable: ΔGRTH   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.107946 0.465226 -0.232030 0.8549 
ΔGRTH(-1) 0.078808 2.055878 0.038333 0.9756 
ΔGRTH(-2) 0.889768 1.604807 0.554439 0.6777 
ΔRMS 9.452925 2.457745 3.846179 0.0161 
ΔRMS(-1) -10.06760 11.25325 -0.894640 0.5354 
ΔRMS(-2) -1.937640 1.071317 -1.808652 0.3215 
ΔUEMP -0.220055 0.212725 -1.034461 0.0489 
ΔUEMP(-1) 0.002703 0.133830 0.020199 0.0987 
ΔUEMP(-2) 0.182365 0.185478 0.983214 0.5054 
ΔPUBINV -1.335599 0.606150 -2.203413 0.2712 
ΔPUBINV(-1) 2.251544 4.759671 0.473046 0.0718 
ΔPUBINV(-2) 1.303268 3.300856 0.394827 0.7606 
ΔCOR -0.419981 0.713553 -0.588577 0.0661 
ΔCOR(-1) 1.132728 0.849721 1.333059 0.4097 
ΔCOR(-2) 0.611644 0.409779 1.492617 0.3758 
ΔRCAP -1.070603 0.896666 -1.193982 0.4439 
ΔRCAP(-1) 3.424828 1.581958 2.164930 0.0275 
ΔRCAP(-2) -1.506295 0.436224 -3.453032 0.1795 
ΔDEBT -7.400154 1.162211 -6.367307 0.0992 
ΔDEBT(-1) 6.361358 8.242796 0.771748 0.5816 
ΔDEBT(-2) 5.051928 4.327935 1.167284 0.4510 
ΔOPEN 0.750164 0.755865 0.992457 0.0502 
ΔOPEN(-1) 0.808943 1.778848 0.454756 0.0728 
ΔOPEN(-2) -0.433507 0.363876 -1.191357 0.4445 
ΔNSI 0.089376 0.031794 2.811055 0.0217 
ΔNSI(-1) 0.110412 0.062530 1.765730 0.0328 
ΔNSI(-2) 0.079243 0.082491 0.960625 0.5128 
ECM(-1) -0.497660 1.110662 -0.448076 0.7318 
     
     R-squared 0.998724     Mean dependent var 0.065667 
Adjusted R-squared 0.964271     S.D. dependent var 0.603112 
S.E. of regression 0.114001     Akaike info criterion -2.941482 
Sum squared resid 0.012996     Schwarz criterion -1.621335 
Log likelihood 70.65150     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.528029 
F-statistic 28.98806     Durbin-Watson stat 2.308337 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.145958    
     
     Source: Computed from E-view 7.0 
 
 
 
 
  
